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Investigators have begun to examine the fleeting urges and inclinations that subjects
experience when performing tasks involving response interference and working memory.
Building on this research, we developed a paradigm in which subjects, after learning to
press certain buttons when presented with certain letters, are presented with two action-
related letters (the memoranda) but must withhold responding (4 s) until cued to emit
the response associated with only one of the two letters. In the Congruent condition, the
action corresponds to the cue (e.g., memoranda = AB, cue = B, response = B); in the
Incongruent condition, the action corresponds to the other item of the memoranda (e.g.,
memoranda = AB, cue = B, response = A). After each trial, subjects inputted a rating
regarding their subjectively experienced “urge to err” on that trial. These introspection-
based data revealed that, as found in previous research, urges to err were strongest for
incongruent trials. Our findings reveal, first, that subjects can successfully perform this
new task, even though it is more complex than that of previous studies, and second,
that, in this new paradigm, reliable subjective, metacognitive data can be obtained on a
trial-by-trial basis. We hope that our novel paradigm will serve as a foundation for future
experimental projects on the relationship between working memory performance and
consciousness—an under-explored nexus whose investigation is likely to reveal insights
about working memory, cognitive control, and metacognition.
Keywords: working memory, cognitive control, consciousness, metacognition, urges to err
INTRODUCTION
Today, investigators have begun to examine the fleeting ‘urges,’ ‘inclinations,’ and ‘tendencies’ that
subjects experience when performing tasks involving response interference and working memory
(Mayr et al., 2003; Mayr, 2004; Morsella, 2005; Mulert et al., 2005; Rosen et al., 2007; Corallo et al.,
2008; Morsella et al., 2009b)1. Evidence suggests that these subjective effects are not ephemeral or
capricious but systematic, reliable, and capable of being predicted by theoretical frameworks. In this
article, we first review in brief the literature on trial-by-trial, subjective (metacognitive) effects that
arise in experimental paradigms involving cognitive control, response interference, and working
memory. Afterward, we introduce a new behavioral paradigm that builds on this prior research
1The terms working memory and response interference are defined below.
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and that could be used to investigate the subjective effects of
working memory performance on a trial-by-trial basis.
Metacognitive, Subjective Aspects of
Cognitive Control during Action
Production
Concerning response interference, for example, investigators
have examined the trial-by-trial subjective effects that occur in
the classic Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). (We discuss the Stroop
task because subjective variants of the paradigm serve as the basis
of the present project involving working memory.) In this task,
subjects are instructed to name the color in which a word is
written. When the word and color are incongruent (e.g., RED
presented in blue), response conflict leads to increased error rates,
response times (RTs), and reported urges to make a mistake
(Morsella et al., 2009a). (To obtain the “urges to err” measure,
after each trial, subjects were presented with, “How strong was
your urge to make a mistake?”, which they rate on an eight-
point scale, in which 1 signified “almost no urge” and 8 signified
“extremely strong urge.”) It has been proposed that, in the
incongruent condition, there is conflict between word-reading
and color-naming plans (Cohen et al., 1990). When the color
matches the word (e.g., RED presented in red), or is presented
on a neutral stimulus (e.g., a series of x’s as in “XXXX”), there is
little or no interference (see review in MacLeod and MacDonald,
2000).
The Stroop task possesses a limitation: the incongruent
conditions cannot be used to distinguish the effects of
interference occurring at different stages of processing (e.g.,
at perceptual-semantic levels or response selection levels). The
Eriksen flanker task (e.g., Eriksen and Schultz, 1979) was
developed to address this issue. It reveals that introducing
interference at different stages of processing (e.g., perceptual
versus response selection) leads to distinct behavioral, neural,
and subjective effects (Coles et al., 1985; van Veen et al., 2001;
Morsella et al., 2009b). In one version of the task, subjects are
trained to press one button with one finger when presented with
the letter S or M and to press another button with another
finger when presented with the letter P or H. Subjects are then
instructed to respond to the stimulus presented in the center of an
array (e.g., SSPSS, SSMSS, targets underscored) and to disregard
the flanking distractors. RTs and self-reported, trial-by-trial ‘urges
to err’ are greater when distractors are associated with a response
that is different from that of the target [response interference (RI);
e.g., SSPSS] than when the distractors are different in appearance
but associated with the same response [perceptual interference
(PI); e.g., SSMSS; Morsella et al., 2009b], a difference attributed
to the automatic activation of response codes by distractors
(Eriksen and Schultz, 1979; Coles et al., 1985; Mattler, 2005).
Responses are fastest when flankers and targets are identical (e.g.,
SSSSS).
The pattern of subjective effects found in the Stroop and
flanker tasks is found also in other response interference
paradigms (see review of other paradigms in Morsella et al.,
2011). In general, stronger subjective effects (e.g., urges to err) are
systematically associated with experimental conditions featuring
high levels of response interference. Specifically, when response
interference is low or absent, urges to err and perceptions of
competitions tend to be low while perceptions of control tend
to be high; when response interference is high, urges to err and
perceptions of competition tend to be high while perceptions of
control tend to be low (Morsella et al., 2009b, 2011).
One interesting circumstance is the Stroop congruent
condition. That trial-by-trial urges to err are low for this
condition is interesting because it is known that, in this situation,
subjects often do read the stimulus word inadvertently: “The
experimenter (perhaps the subject as well) cannot discriminate
which dimension gave rise to the response on a given congruent
trial” (MacLeod and MacDonald, 2000, p. 386). (See treatments of
the Stroop congruent condition in Eidels et al., 2010 and Roelofs,
2010.) Importantly, urges to err for the congruent condition
are comparable to those of the ‘neutral’ condition of the Stroop
task, in which the color is presented on an illegible letter string
(Morsella et al., 2009b). It has been found that ‘urges to err
by reading the word’ are greater when words are presented in
standard black font than when the same words are presented in
a congruent color (Molapour et al., 2011), suggesting that the
act of color-naming masks introspection of the reading process
which may be occurring automatically. This finding has been
explained as an instance of synchrony blindness, in which one
is unaware that two distinct cognitive operations are activated
when the operations lead to the same action plan (Molapour
et al., 2011). This notion is consistent with the view that one is
conscious only of the ‘outputs’ of processes, not of the processes
themselves (Lashley, 1951). (See review of this notion in Morsella
and Bargh, 2010.)
The pattern of results reviewed above, in which incongruent
conditions yield response interference effects and congruent
conditions yield synchrony blindness has been explained
by theoretical developments about the primary function of
conscious/controlled processes in action production (Sanders,
1983; Pashler, 1995; cf. Morsella, 2005; Morsella et al., 2011).
Importantly, one of these theoretical developments (Morsella,
2005) was intended to explain a different class of phenomena,
such as why skeletomotor action conflicts (e.g., holding one’s
breath) reliably perturb consciousness but other kinds of
conflicts, such as intersensory conflicts (e.g., the McGurk effect;
McGurk and MacDonald, 1976) and conflicts involving smooth
muscle, do not (for further explanation, see General Discussion
and Morsella, 2005; Morsella et al., 2009a, 2011).
These trial-by-trial subjective effects are unlikely to reflect
solely an artifact of subjects observing their own RTs, for the
effects arise even when the influence of RTs is statistically
accounted for, and also when RT effects are eradicated by having
subjects delay their response for a substantial span (Morsella
et al., 2009b). Moreover, though subjects’ post-error corrections
in interference paradigms lead, on a subsequent trial, to improved
performance (e.g., faster RTs), reported urges to err actually
increase in such trials (Etkin et al., 2010; Gyurak et al., 2011). This
contrast has been explained as a dissociation between implicit
measures of performance (e.g., RT) and explicit measures (e.g.,
self-reports about task difficulty; Etkin et al., 2010; Gyurak et al.,
2011).
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Metacognitive, Subjective Aspects of
Control during Working Memory
Performance
The findings from the Stroop and flanker tasks stem from
paradigms in which targets and distractors are visually available
as stimuli that are present in the external environment. However,
in everyday life, seldom is it the case that planned action is
driven wholly by representations that are activated by stimuli
in the current environment. Many actions, such as goal-
directed actions, are guided by representations that are generated
internally (Miller et al., 1960; Neisser, 1976). These goal-directed
actions include voluntarily holding one’s breath, searching for
one’s car keys, or holding a telephone number in mind. These
tasks require that representations be held actively in mind with
minimal aid from the external environment and even in the
presence of distracting, external stimulation. These acts usually
involve working memory, which has been defined as a temporary,
capacity-limited storage system under attentional control, used to
intentionally hold and manipulate information (Baddeley, 1986,
2007).
Theorists have long noted that working memory is intimately
related to conscious processing (Gray, 2004; Baddeley, 2007;
LeDoux, 2008; Oberauer and Hein, 2012). It might well be that
no mental operation is as consistently coupled with conscious
processing as is working memory (Baddeley, 2007; LeDoux,
2008): when one tries to hold or manipulate information
that is not furnished by the external world, one’s conscious
mind seems to be occupied with the task at hand (James,
1890). This occurs, for example, when one holds a to-
be-dialed telephone number in mind and mental imagery
occupies one’s conscious mind till the number is dialed
(Paivio, 1979). Although many sophisticated processes can
be carried out unconsciously, the deployment of working
memory tends to be a conscious phenomenon (but see Hassin,
2005).
In one experiment involving working memory (Hubbard et al.,
2013), subjects were instructed to hold two stimuli (e.g., the ‘S’
and ‘P’ of the flanker task) in mind until a cue prompted them to
respond to one of the two stimuli; in another version (Hubbard
et al., 2013), subjects were instructed to respond to the letter
in the center of the screen (the target) but to delay responding
until presented with a subsequent letter (the distractor), with
subjects instructed to disregard the characteristics of distractors
and emit only the response associated with the target. (It is
important to note that, in this experiment, there was a delay
period between the target and the distractor.) This working-
memory version of the flanker task led to the same kinds of
subjective effects associated with the RI and PI conditions of the
traditional version of the task (for similar findings, see Jantz et al.,
2013).
Relevant research (Jantz et al., 2013, 2014; see also Kroll
and Kellicutt, 1972) reveals that the process of rehearsal during
the use of working memory produces mental imagery of
the memoranda throughout the delay period. Specifically, the
investigators examined the subjective effects of (a) holding
in mind information having a low versus high memory
load, and (b) holding memoranda in mind during the
presentation of distractors (e.g., visual stimuli associated with
a response incompatible with that of the memoranda). The
data revealed that higher rates of rehearsal (conscious imagery)
occurred in the high load and distractor conditions than in
comparable control conditions. Examination of the temporal
properties of the rehearsal-based imagery revealed that imagery
events occurred evenly throughout the delay period. The
imagery is experienced as repetitive and as punctate (i.e.,
discrete), just as the lyrics from a subvocalized song are
experienced during a span but only one word at a time.
When such imagery is intentional and not an involuntary
“earworm,” the imagery must be activated effortfully (Farah,
2000).
Limitations of such working memory experiments is that,
in many tasks, (a) subjects know which response to execute
when presented with the “go” cue, (b) subjects know which
information from the memoranda will be action-relevant, and
(c) the association between the retrieval cue and the part of the
memoranda that must be acted upon is straightforward. Such
characteristics are not found in many everyday tasks involving
working memory. For example, regarding a and b, one might
hold memoranda in mind but be uncertain regarding which
memorandum will, in a given context, be action-relevant. For
instance, when shopping for groceries, though one might hold
in mind a list of many food items (e.g., vegetables, fruits, and
meats), at one moment in time and in a particular context,
one might act with respect to only a subset of the items. Such
a constraining context might be that one is in the vegetable
section or hearing an advertisement stating that only fruits,
of all things on the shopping list, are on sale. The cues from
such contexts cause one to respond to only a subset of the
tokens composing the memoranda. Regarding c, it is often the
case that a retrieval cue signifies, not that one should act in a
manner corresponding to the memorandum that is associated
with that cue, but that one should act in a manner corresponding
to some other component of the memoranda. For example,
if the memoranda consists of the tokens X and Y, the cue
Y could signify that one should respond, not to Y, but to
X. Experiments focusing on the subjective aspects of working
memory performance have not yet yielded data from such
circumstances.
To deal with this limitations and gap in the literature,
we developed a new behavioral paradigm in which subjects,
after learning to press certain buttons when presented with
certain letters, are presented with two action-related letters (the
memoranda) but must withhold responding (4 s) until cued to
emit the response associated with only one of the two letters. In
the Congruent condition, the action corresponds to the prompt
(e.g., memoranda = AB, prompt = B, response = B); in the
Incongruent condition, the action corresponds to the other
item of the memoranda (e.g., memoranda = AB, prompt = B,
response = A). After each trial, subjects inputted a rating
regarding their urge to err. This was our primary dependent
measure.
Our primary aim was to develop a new experimental
paradigm that involves working memory and yields subjective,
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metacognitive data on a trial-by-trial basis. We strove to develop
a task that subjects can perform even though (a) they do not know
which response to execute before being presented with a go cue,
(b) they do not know which information from the memoranda
will be action-relevant, and (c) the association between the
retrieval cue and the component(s) of the memoranda to be
acted upon is not straightforward, requiring the application of a
complex rule held in prospective memory2.
Regarding our task, subjects responded by pressing one of
two keys with either their index finger or middle finger (as
in the flanker task; Eriksen and Schultz, 1979). To diminish
spatial compatibility effects (e.g., the Simon effect; Simon et al.,
1970) stemming from such a left/right response mapping, the
memoranda was presented, not with one letter to the side of
the other, but with one letter above the other. In this paradigm,
for the Incongruent condition, subjects cannot simply apply the
strategy of always pressing the key opposite to that of the prompt,
because of catch trials in which the memoranda consists of two
identical items (memoranda = AA or BB). Catch trials, in which
the memoranda consisted of two identical letters, composed half
of the trials.
It could be that, in the standard (non-catch) trials of the
Incongruent condition, the prompt induces interference only
because it primes motorically a response that is incongruent
with the intended responses. To examine this methodological
limitation and for the sake of comparison, we included another
condition in which the prompt was not a letter (a dot, as in
Hubbard et al., 2013), but was associated with the spatial location
of a target; in the Incongruent condition, subjects responded to
the item that was not cued spatially.
Our new paradigm builds incrementally on previous research
(e.g., Eriksen and Schultz, 1979; Hubbard et al., 2013). Thus,
it yields the kind of incremental research that is important
for progress in the field of psychological science and that
does not involve the traditional method of hypothesis testing
(see General Discussion and Nosek et al., 2012). Because it
is a new paradigm, our aims and predictions had to be
humble and conservative. Again, our primary aim was to assess
whether subjects are capable of performing this task. Our
secondary aim was to assess whether the task could yield the
kinds of subjective effects that have been found with previous
studies (e.g., Hubbard et al., 2013; Jantz et al., 2013). Such
effects would stem from the factor Congruence (i.e., congruent
versus incongruent trials): we predicted that, on average, urges
to err would be stronger for incongruent than congruent
trials.
For our primary aim and to develop and refine the
new paradigm, we first conducted a pilot study to assess
whether subjects can perform this task, which is more
complicated than those of previous studies (e.g., Hubbard et al.,
2013).
2It is worth mentioning here that subjects can perform successfully a variant of
the classic flanker task in which, on some trials, subjects must perform an action
that is the opposite of that indicated by the target (Velasquez and Morsella, 2016).
In Velasquez and Morsella (2016), this action is prompted by a cue (e.g., a dot
presented beneath the target) that is presented in addition to the flankers.
PILOT STUDY
Method
Subjects
San Francisco State University students (n = 29) participated for
course credit. The involvement of human subjects in our project
was approved by the Institutional Review Board at San Francisco
State University.
Stimuli and Apparatus
The stimuli for the memoranda consisted of two letters (A
and B), which were separated by a horizontal bar, thereby
resembling the presentation of a fraction (e.g., A over B, or
A/B). The letter pair was displayed within a centered visual angle
of 4.18◦ × 6.56◦ (3.5 cm × 5.5 cm). The horizontal bar was
3.5 cm wide. The positioning of the letters, along the vertical
axis, was counterbalanced fully across the trials. For the Letter
Prompt condition, the prompt was one of these letters. For
the Dot Prompt condition, the stimulus was a filled circle (•).
Both kinds of prompts were displayed within a centered visual
angle of 2.98◦ × 4.18◦ (2.5 cm × 3.5 cm). All stimuli were
presented on a computer monitor (50.8 cm) with a viewing
distance of approximately 48 cm. All questions and instructions
were presented in san serif black font (∼36-point) on a gray
background. Stimulus presentation was controlled by SuperLab
Software. Catch trials, in which the memoranda consisted of two
identical letters, composed half of the trials.
Procedures
Subjects were instructed to respond to prompts as quickly and
as accurately as possible. They pressed the semi-colon key (;)
when responding to the letter “A” and the apostrophe key (’)
when responding to the letter “B”. The mapping of keys to
letters was fully counterbalanced across subjects. Each trial began
with a ready prompt (?). Subjects, to indicate their readiness
to commence the trial, pressed the space bar with their left
hand. After a blank screen (300 ms) and a fixation cross (“+”
for 500 ms), the memoranda were presented (1 s). Which
memoranda were presented was randomly determined. This was
followed by a delay period (4 s) that was followed by the prompt
(3 s). In the Letter Prompt condition, a letter prompt appeared
in the center of the screen. In the Dot Prompt condition, a filled
circle (the prompt) appeared either above or below a horizontal
line presented in the center of the screen (Figure 1). Subjects
were instructed to respond to the prompt as quickly and as
accurately as possible. In the Congruent condition, subjects were
instructed to press the button which corresponded to the prompt.
In the Incongruent condition, subjects were instructed to press
the button which corresponded to the ‘other letter’ in the pair
composing the memoranda.
After this response, subjects were asked to rate how strong
their urge was to make a mistake, on an eight-point scale, in
which 1 signifies “almost no urge” and 8 signifies an “extremely
strong urge” (based on Morsella et al., 2009a,b). During the data
collection for this pilot study, we took the opportunity to collect
electroencephalographic data from the subjects. These pilot,
neural data will not be discussed further. No such recordings
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FIGURE 1 | Left: sequence of events during an incongruent trial having a dot prompt (see Pilot Study); Right: an incongruent trial having a letter
prompt (see Experiment). Not drawn to scale. Subjects were presented with two action-related letters (the memoranda) but delayed responding (4 s) until cued to
emit the response associated with only one of the two letters. In the Congruent condition, the action corresponds to the prompt (e.g., memoranda = AB, prompt
refers to B, response = B); in the Incongruent condition, the action corresponds to the other item of the memoranda (e.g., memoranda = AB, prompt refers to B,
response = A). After each trial, subjects inputted a rating regarding their urge to err on an eight-point scale, in which 1 signified “almost no urge” and 8 signified an
“extremely strong urge.”
occurred for the experiment (presented below) that was based on
this pilot study.
Stimuli were presented in random order and care was taken
to ensure that subjects responded an equal number of times to
letters in either the top or bottom position. The experimental
session consisted of 384 trials. These trials were divided into two
large blocks (Dot Prompt versus Letter Prompt), each having 192
trials. Each of the two blocks contained miniblocks of Congruent
and Incongruent trials (96 trials per miniblock). Because of
data removal (discussed below) and the nature of the pseudo-
randomization that was employed, the presentation order of the
four kinds of blocks was not perfectly counter-balanced across
subjects. This shortcoming is not featured in our experiment
(presented below).
Once subjects completed the experiment, they completed
a demographic form and responded to a series of funneled
debriefing questions (following the procedures of Bargh and
Chartrand, 2000), which included general questions to assess
whether subjects (a) were aware of the purpose of the study,
(b) had any strategies for completing the task, (c) had anything
interfere with their performance on the task, and (d) tried
their best to remember the letter pair that was presented at the
beginning of the trial.
The data from four subjects were excluded from analysis, for
the following reasons. For three of the subjects, the experimental
software ceased to function, causing the experimental session
to end prematurely. One of the subjects did not follow the
instructions and pressed an incorrect button on all but one
of the trials of the Dot Prompt condition. For the data from
the remaining 29 subjects, based on the procedures of previous
studies (Woodworth and Schlosberg, 1954; van Veen et al., 2001;
Morsella et al., 2009a,b), we excluded from our analysis RTs less
than or equal to 200 ms or greater than 2000 ms. For the RT
analysis, we removed data from trials in which responses were
inaccurate. This trimming method resulted in the loss of 502
(4.5%) out of 11,136 trials. No urge to err data were missing.
Results
Urges to Err
In a fully within-subjects ANOVA with Congruence (Congruent
versus Incongruent) as one factor and Prompt (dot versus letter)
as the other factor, there was a main effect of Congruence,
F(1,28) = 20.73, p < 0.0001 (η2p = 0.43), in which urges were
stronger for the Incongruent than the Congruent conditions, and
a main effect of Prompt, F(1,28) = 15.57, p < 0.001 (η2p = 0.36),
in which urges were stronger for the dot prompt than the letter
prompt (see descriptive statistic for all conditions in Table 1).
There was no interaction between the two factors, F(1,28)= 0.50,
p = 0.487. Planned comparisons revealed that all contrasts
between the conditions were significant (ts > 2.9, ps < 0.05)
except for that between Dot-Congruent and Letter-Incongruent,
p= 0.63.
Error Rates
Importantly, subjects were capable of performing this task:
the mean proportion of errors across the 384 trials was 0.03
(SD = 0.029). Error rates were comparable across the four
conditions (Table 1): in a fully within-subjects ANOVA with
Congruence (Congruent versus Incongruent) as one factor and
with Prompt (dot versus letter) as the other factor, there was
no main effect of Congruence, F(1,28) = 2.36, p = 0.14, and
no main effect of Prompt, F(1,28) = 0.002, p = 0.97. There
was no interaction between the two factors, F(1,28) = 0.006,
p= 0.94.
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Response Times
In a fully within-subjects ANOVA with Congruence (Congruent
versus Incongruent) as one factor and Prompt (dot versus letter)
as the other factor, there was a main effect of Congruence,
F(1,28) = 69.74, p < 0.0001 (η2p = 0.71), in which RTs were
longer for the Incongruent than the Congruent conditions,
and a main effect of Prompt, F(1,28) = 7.93, p = 0.009
(η2p = 0.22), in which RTs were longer for the dot prompt than
the letter prompt (see descriptive statistics for all conditions
in Table 1). There was no interaction between the two factors,
F(1,28) = 0.019, p = 0.891. Planned comparisons revealed that
all contrasts between the conditions were significant (ts > 2.2,
ps < 0.05) except for that between Dot-Congruent and Letter-
Incongruent, p = 0.13. The mean correlation between a subject’s
RTs and urges, stemming from the 384 trials, was 0.51 (Fisher’s
r to z, p < 0.001), suggesting that subjects may have based
their judgments on observing their response times (see General
Discussion).
Discussion
The findings from our pilot study revealed that subjects are
capable of performing this task, even though the task is more
complicated than that of previous studies (e.g., Hubbard et al.,
2013). On average, accuracy rates were above 90%. However,
our pilot study suffered from two limitations. First, the letter
prompt, unlike the dot prompt in the Dot condition, appeared
always in the center of the screen. This difference in the nature of
spatial location of the prompts in the Dot and Letter conditions
renders it difficult to compare the effects of the two conditions.
Second, the order of presentation of the blocks of trials was not
counterbalanced fully across subjects. This was due in part to the
fact that the data from some subjects were excluded from analysis.
EXPERIMENT
Our experiment was based on previous research (e.g., Hubbard
et al., 2013) and on our pilot study. Unlike in our pilot study,
in the Letter Prompt condition, the letter prompt did not
appear in the center of screen but in the location where, in the
Dot condition, the dot would appear (i.e., above or below the
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for conditions of the Pilot Study and
Experiment: means per condition with SE presented in parentheses.
Urges to err Error rates Response times
Pilot Study
Dot Congruent 1.67 (0.11) 0.02 (0.005) 569.34 (24.71)
Dot Incongruent 1.99 (0.14) 0.04 (0.01) 655.55 (28.68)
Letter Congruent 1.45 (0.13) 0.02 (0.01) 520.94 (19.98)
Letter Incongruent 1.71 (0.14) 0.04 (0.01) 603.54 (23.81)
Experiment
Dot Congruent 1.66 (0.09) 0.04 (0.01) 679.03 (22.81)
Dot Incongruent 1.88 (0.10) 0.05 (0.01) 761.58 (23.14)
Letter Congruent 1.47 (0.08) 0.02 (0.003) 657.22 (24.46)
Letter Incongruent 1.67 (0.09) 0.04 (0.01) 666.12 (19.89)
horizontal line; Figure 1). In the Congruent Condition, the letter
prompt was presented always in the location that corresponded
to the location of the letter held in memory. Catch trials, in which
the memoranda consisted of two identical letters, composed half
of the 384 trials. The sample size for our experiment was more
than double that of our pilot study.
Subjects
San Francisco State University students (n = 64; females = 48;
MAge = 22.12, SD = 5.44) participated for course credit. The
involvement of human subjects in our project was approved by
the Institutional Review Board at San Francisco State University.
Procedures
The procedures were identical to those of our pilot study except
that (1) the letter prompt now appeared in the location where,
in the Dot condition, the dot would appear (Figure 1); (2)
the background of the screen was white; (3) all stimuli were
presented in black font on an Apple iMac computer monitor
(50.8 cm); stimulus presentation was controlled by PsyScope
software (Cohen et al., 1993); (4) for the 384 trials, the order
of presentation of the two large blocks (Dot prompt [192
trials] versus Letter prompt [192 trials]) and of the miniblocks
(Congruent [96 trials] and Incongruent [96 trials]) were fully
counterbalanced across subjects.
The data from eight subjects were excluded from analysis, for
the following reasons. One of the subjects received a telephone
call and, upon receiving it, terminated the experimental session.
For two of the subjects, there was a malfunction regarding
the experimental software, causing the experiment to end
abruptly and prematurely. For one of the subjects, there was a
programming error in the software script. Three of the subjects
did not follow instructions and did not seem to understand what
was asked of them. (The first of these participants, instead of
performing the task, played with the chair; the second performed
the Incongruent condition as if it were the Congruent condition;
and the third was not attending to the computer screen.) Last,
one of the subjects fell asleep during the experimental session.
For the data from the remaining 64 subjects, the trimming
method from our pilot study resulted in the loss of 1,553
(6.3%) out of 24,576 trials. Omitted responses and typing errors
resulted in the loss of 338 (1.4%) out of 24,576 urge to err
ratings.
Urges to Err
As illustrated in Figure 2, in a fully within-subjects ANOVA
with Congruence (Congruent versus Incongruent) as one factor
and Prompt (dot versus letter) as the other factor, there was
a main effect of Congruence, F(1,63) = 25.99, p < 0.0001
(η2p = 0.29), in which urges were stronger for the Incongruent
than the Congruent conditions, and a main effect of Prompt,
F(1,63) = 13.93, p < 0.001 (η2p = 0.18), in which urges
were stronger for the dot prompt than the letter prompt (see
descriptive statistics for all conditions in Table 1). (A more
conservative, Friedman test for the four kinds of conditions
experienced by subjects was significant, p < 0.0001.) In the
ANOVA, there was no interaction between the two factors,
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FIGURE 2 | Mean urges to err as a function of prompt and condition
(congruent versus incongruent). Error bars indicate SEs.
F(1,63) = 0.05, p = 0.82. The main effects of Congruence
and Prompt were found also following Bonferroni correction,
ps < 0.05. Planned comparisons revealed contrasts between the
Dot-Incongruent condition and the Dot-Congruent condition,
t(63) = 4.33, p < 0.0001, and between the Letter-Incongruent
condition and Letter-Congruent condition, t(63) = 3.24,
p < 0.01. These same contrasts between conditions was found in
our pilot study and with the non-parametric, Wilcoxon signed-
ranked test, ps < 0.0001.
In our experiment, there were three dependent measures:
urges to err, accuracy, and RTs. Tests of normality (the
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test) revealed that, for each of the
four conditions (i.e., Dot-Congruent, Dot-Incongruent, Letter-
Congruent, and Letter-Incongruent), the distribution of by-
subject means did not violate the assumption of normality
(Kolmogorov–Smirnov ps > 0.05). In addition, for each of
these three dependent measures, the differences between the
means of the Congruent and Incongruent conditions for the
dot and letter prompts, too, did not violate the assumption
of normality (Kolmogorov–Smirnov ps > 0.20). Nevertheless,
for the sake of thoroughness and because some distributions
of values appeared leptokurtic and highly skewed, and because,
for three particular conditions (i.e., urges to err for the
Letter-Congruent, and error rates for the Dot-Congruent
condition and Letter-Congruent condition), the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov ps did approach significance (ps = 0.06), we provide
in this section, where appropriate and in addition to the
results from our parametric tests, the results from comparable
non-parametric tests, which are more conservative. We also
provide information about the kurtosis and skewness of each
distribution. For urges to err, the skewness of each distribution
was: Dot-Congruent = 1.66, Dot-Incongruent = 1.00, Letter-
Congruent = 2.15, and Letter-Incongruent = 1.91. For
this same measure, the kurtosis for each distribution was:
Dot-Congruent = 2.25, Dot-Incongruent = 0.22, Letter-
Congruent= 4.38, and Letter-Incongruent= 3.54.
Error Rates
Again, as in the case of our pilot study, subjects were capable
of performing the task: the mean proportion of errors across
the 384 trials was 0.04 (SD = 0.028). See error rates for
all conditions in Table 1. Unlike in our pilot study, error
rates varied by condition: in a fully within-subjects ANOVA
with Congruence (Congruent versus Incongruent) as one factor
and Prompt (dot versus letter) as the other factor, there was
a main effect of Congruence, F(1,63) = 22.88, p < 0.0001
(η2p = 0.27), and a main effect of Prompt, F(1,63) = 11.76,
p = 0.001 (η2p = 0.16). (A Friedman test for the four
kinds of conditions experienced by subjects was significant,
p < 0.0001.) In the ANOVA, there was no interaction
between the two factors, F(1,63) = 2.03, p = 0.16. The
main effects of Congruence and Prompt were found also
following Bonferroni correction, ps< 0.05. Planned comparisons
revealed contrasts between the Dot-Incongruent condition and
the Dot-Congruent condition, t(63) = 2.48, p < 0.05) and
between the Letter-Incongruent condition and Letter-Congruent
condition, t(63) = 3.99, p < 0.001. These same contrasts
between conditions were obtained with the non-parametric,
Wilcoxon signed-ranked test, ps < 0.01. For error rates, the
skewness of each distribution was: Dot-Congruent = 2.21,
Dot-Incongruent = 1.29, Letter-Congruent = 1.83, and Letter-
Incongruent = 2.51. For this same measure, the kurtosis
for each distribution was: Dot-Congruent = 5.23, Dot-
Incongruent = 1.24, Letter-Congruent = 3.43, and Letter-
Incongruent= 7.57.
Response Times
In a fully within-subjects ANOVA with Congruence (Congruent
versus Incongruent) as one factor and Prompt (dot versus letter)
as the other factor, there was a main effect of Congruence,
F(1,63) = 30.80, p < 0.0001 (η2p = 0.33), in which RTs were
longer for the Incongruent than the Congruent conditions,
and a main effect of Prompt, F(1,63) = 32.61, p < 0.0001
(η2p = 0.34), in which RTs were longer for the dot prompt than
the letter prompt (see descriptive statistic for all conditions in
Table 1). (A Friedman test for the four kinds of conditions
experienced by subjects was significant, p < 0.0001.) There was
an interaction between the two factors, F(1,63)= 20.07, p< 0.001
(η2p = 0.24). The main effects of Congruence and Prompt were
found also following Bonferroni correction, ps < 0.05. Planned
comparisons revealed contrasts between the Dot-Incongruent
condition and the Dot-Congruent condition, t(63) = 7.16,
p < 0.0001 (Wilcoxon signed-ranked test, p < 0.001), but no
difference between Letter-Congruent and Letter-Incongruent,
t(63) = −0.76, p = 0.45. Although the contrast between Letter-
Congruent and Letter-Incongruent was non-significant in this
experiment, it was a significant effect in our pilot study. For RTs,
the skewness of each distribution was: Dot-Congruent = 0.31,
Dot-Incongruent = 0.03, Letter-Congruent = 0.60, and Letter-
Incongruent = 0.28. For this same measure, the kurtosis
for each distribution was: Dot-Congruent = −0.54, Dot-
Incongruent = −0.55, Letter-Congruent = −0.47, and Letter-
Incongruent=−0.63.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 June 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 927
fpsyg-07-00927 June 24, 2016 Time: 15:8 # 8
Garcia et al. Subjective Aspects of Working Memory
Correlational Analyses
The mean correlation between a subject’s RTs and urges,
stemming from the 384 trials, was 0.37 (Fisher’s r to z, p < 0.01),
suggesting that subjects may have based their judgments on the
observations of their response times (see General Discussion).
Having a sample size much larger than that of our pilot
study allowed us to examine with confidence the correlation
coefficients, between RT and urges to err, per condition: Dot-
Congruent (r = 0.38), Dot-Incongruent (r = 0.45), Letter-
Congruent (r = 0.35), Letter-Incongruent (r = 0.40). Fisher’s r
to z revealed that, given the number (n = 96) of observations
per condition, each of these coefficients, which resembled that
of the coefficient found when we collapsed across conditions,
is significant, ps < 0.05. Regarding the relationship between
accuracy and urges to err, it was not the case that, if a subjects’
error rate was high, his or her mean urge ratings would vary
proportionally, r = 0.18, p = 0.16. This lack of a correlation
between mean accuracy and mean error rate must be interpreted
only cautiously, as error rates were very low, which, for a
correlational analysis, could introduce a restriction of the range.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our primary aim was to investigate the under-explored subjective
(and metacognitive) aspects of working memory performance.
With this aim, we built on investigations that have begun
to examine the nature of the subjective, metacognitive states
associated with different kinds of response interference (Mayr
et al., 2003; Mayr, 2004; Morsella, 2005; Mulert et al., 2005;
Rosen et al., 2007; Corallo et al., 2008; Morsella et al., 2009b) and
developed a new experimental paradigm that involves working
memory and subjective data (urges to err) on a trial-by-trial
basis. Our primary goal was to develop a paradigm that subjects
are capable of performing and in which (a) subjects do not
know which response to execute before being presented with
a go cue, (b) subjects do not know which information from
the memoranda will be action-relevant, and (c) the association
between the retrieval cue and the part of the memoranda to be
acted upon is not straightforward and requires the application of
a complex rule held in prospective memory. Developing such a
new paradigm, independent of the potential findings it could be
used to obtain, is an important contribution in its own right.
As an initial foray involving a new paradigm and an uncharted
area of research, our project demanded conservative predictions
and humble conclusions. First, and of most importance, the error
rate data revealed that subjects are capable of performing this
task, even though this task is more complex and difficult than
previous tasks (e.g., Hubbard et al., 2013): accuracy rates in our
paradigm were greater than 90%. Because of the catch trials,
subjects could not simply apply the strategy of, in the Incongruent
condition, making a response opposite of that indicated by the
prompt. To obtain high accuracy rates in this paradigm, it
is mandatory for the entire memoranda to be retrieved from
memory.
As predicted, the subjective data revealed an effect of the factor
Congruence, in which urges to err were strongest for incongruent
trials. In our experiment, Congruence produced the predicted
effect both when the prompt was a letter and when the prompt
was not a letter (the Dot condition), suggesting that the effect of
Congruence in the Letter Prompt Condition did not reflect only
effects of (a), in the Incongruent condition, the letter prompt
priming a motor response that happened to be incompatible
with that of the intended, memory-based response, or (b), in the
Congruent condition, the letter prompt incidentally priming the
response associated with it. In addition, finding an effect from
Congruence in both the Dot and Letter conditions suggests that
the effect was not simply an artifact of subjects applying the
strategy of, in the Congruent condition, completely disregarding
the memoranda and attending only to the prompts. The factor
Prompt (Letter versus Dot) led to subjective effects in which urges
to err tended to be stronger for the Dot condition than the Letter
condition. Understanding the nature of this effect will require
further investigation.
Although urges to err correlated with RTs, the patterns of
results found with the two kinds of data did not always mirror
each other. In prior research, it has been found that, at times,
trial-by-trial urges to err are more sensitive to experimental
manipulations than are RTs (Morsella et al., 2011), just as RTs
are often more sensitive to experimental manipulations than are
error rates (e.g., in the Stroop task). In the present experiment,
for the Letter condition of our experiment, there was no effect
of Congruence on RTs, but subjective effects (e.g., urges to err)
did arise systematically from this experimental manipulation. (A
congruence effect on RTs was found, however, in the pilot study.)
Such interesting dissociations between subjective and behavioral
data have been found in previous studies involving trial-by-trial
subjective measures (Morsella et al., 2009b). The dissociations
discovered in our experiment require replication and further
investigation.
In light of the present findings, it is important to appreciate
that there is an important difference between trial-by-trial
questions regarding task difficulty and questions about the kinds
of fleeting urges that our subjects experienced. We have learned
from previous endeavors that some subjects construe these two
questions as pertaining to separate and distinct phenomena. For
example, questions about task difficulty are about the task and not
necessarily about the subjects’ just-experienced subjective state
(i.e., the urge). In the present project, we queried about trial-
by-trial urges because doing so replicates trial-by-trial measures
used in previous studies involving response interference (e.g.,
Morsella et al., 2009b), and because, if the question were instead
about task difficulty, some subjects might perceive the question as
concerning, not his or her just-experienced subjective state, but
rather about (a) how most people would perceive the difficulty
of the task or (b) the difficulty of the task in terms of the nature
of, not one’s actual experience, but properties of the task (e.g., the
number of mental operations that the task demands).
As with all forms of self-report data, it is challenging to verify
what subjects are introspecting at the moment when they are
making their judgments. Self-report judgments are subject to
memory distortions, even when they are made moments after the
critical event (Block, 2007). One could question whether subjects
in our pilot study and experiment were actually experiencing
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conscious urges. However, given the systematic changes in urges
to err as a result of condition, it seems unlikely that subjects
did not experience urges, did not follow instructions, and
provided ratings only because of, say, experimental demand. This
conclusion could be further corroborated by coupling our new
paradigm with neuroimaging technologies. Such technologies
would allow one to detect neural markers of conscious urges (see
relevant evidence in Gray et al., 2013). It is important to note that
neuroimaging evidence corroborates that, in other paradigms,
subjects are in fact accurate about reporting the incidence of
conscious mental contents (cf., Logothetis and Schall, 1989;
Wyland et al., 2003; Mason et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 2007;
McVay and Kane, 2010).
Subjects’ judgments may be influenced by an overall sense of
difficulty, which may be introspected directly or indirectly from
inferences based on, for example, RT performance. In short, it
is difficult to rule out an influence on judgments of processing
speed or a general sense of effort (or any combination thereof).
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, trial-by-trial subjective effects
are unlikely to reflect solely an artifact of subjects observing
their own RTs, for the effects arise even when the influence of
RTs is statistically accounted for, and also when RT effects are
eradicated (e.g., by having subjects delay their response; Morsella
et al., 2009b). In addition, these theoretically predicted subjective
effects are present when subjects merely sustain incompatible
intentions (e.g., to point left and right) in a motionless state in
which no response is emitted (Morsella et al., 2009a). Last, it is
worth reiterating that, though subjects’ post-error corrections in
interference paradigms lead, on a subsequent trial, to improved
performance (e.g., faster RTs), reported urges to err actually
increase in such trials (Etkin et al., 2010; Gyurak et al., 2011)—
a contrast that has been explained as a dissociation between
implicit measures of performance (e.g., RT) and explicit measures
(e.g., self-reports about task difficulty; Etkin et al., 2010; Gyurak
et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, because of the limitations inherent in
introspection paradigms, we cannot rule out conclusively
that ratings were based on self-observations involving RT
performance or on strategies. Regarding the latter, subjects may
have based their judgments on folk beliefs regarding how one
should comport oneself in an experiment involving congruent
and incongruent conditions. For example, perhaps subjects based
their judgments on heuristics such as, “If I am in the Incongruent
condition, then I will always report 6 as the rating; if I am in the
Congruent condition, then I will always report 1 as the rating.”
Although, this cannot be fully ruled out by the present data, this
alternative seems unlikely given that subjects’ ratings tended to
vary across trials within each condition. For instance, for the
Congruent Dot condition, the first seven ratings from a subject
selected at random were 1, 1, 1, 7, 1, 1, and 8. Another subject
yielded the following sequence of ratings for a sequence of six
trials in the Letter Incongruent condition: 1, 1, 2, 1, 4, and
3. Of course, it may well be that subjects were using a more
sophisticated heuristic when engendering these current data
(Morsella et al., 2009b).
Future investigations on the subjective aspects of working
memory performance are necessary to qualify the kinds of
conclusions that can be drawn from these initial introspection-
based data. Future research could also focus on the nature of
the conscious imagery, about the memoranda, during the delay
period. Such experiments might benefit from having a delay
period that is longer and from having manipulations in which
the amount of information held in the memoranda is varied
experimentally, as in Jantz et al. (2014). Regarding the former, in
our experiment, the delay period was too short (4 s) for subjects to
be able to indicate conscious imagery by button press. Regarding
the latter, with the current version of our new task, it is unlikely
that a memory load would arise from a memoranda consisting of
only two items.
CONCLUSION
The findings from our experiment reveal that (a) subjects
can successfully perform this task, (b) reliable subjective and
behavioral data can be obtained on a trial-by-trial basis, and
(c) the subjective effects associated with this working memory
task are systematic, measurable, and arise from processing in a
principled fashion. We hope that our novel paradigm will serve as
a foundation for future experimental projects on the relationship
between working memory performance and consciousness—an
under-explored nexus whose investigation is likely to reveal
many insights about working memory, consciousness, and
metacognition.
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